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# Ratcliffe visit shows Western deterrence in doubt
- URL: https://hq-brief.ghost.io/ratcliffe-visit-shows-western-deterrence-in-doubt/
- Published: 2026-08-28T14:22:52.000Z
- Updated: 2026-08-28T14:29:23.000Z
- Description: Despatch no. 12 / ANALYSIS
- Author: LDC Team

Nothing could have been more calculated to galvanise the rumour mills of the internet age than the news that the head of the CIA had made an unexpected solo visit to Moscow, on an unknown mission during which he met with his Russian intelligence counterparts. The secretive atmosphere fuelled speculation, gossip and conspiracy theories, not the least of which was that of a diplomatic dash to avert nuclear apocalypse. In sober reality, what do we know about this unusual initiative?

On 25 August, an American C-17 transport plane flew from its last stop in Riga to Moscow, where it landed around 07.00 GMT, taking off again just before 17.00\. We now know that CIA director John Ratcliffe was on board and spent some eight hours in Moscow, in discussions with senior intelligence officials, but not with Vladimir Putin. What was the reason for this meeting? Though unusual, it was not unprecedented: in November 2021 then CIA director William Burns flew to Moscow, met his intelligence opposite numbers and even spoke to Putin by telephone, in an effort to avert the invasion of Ukraine. That was not an encouraging precedent for Ratcliffe’s visit.

Speculation about the purpose of the meeting ranges from the weakest scenario – that Ratcliffe requested the release of American prisoners – to the more credible hypotheses that the talks were aimed at discouraging Russian support for Iran, or to prevent further mobilisation against Ukraine, or to warn against any Russian adventure against the Baltic States. The Russian press appeared to assume Ukraine was the topic, without being any better informed than Western media. Although it is perfectly possible there were several items on the agenda, high-level interventions such as Ratcliffe’s usually reflect concern over one pre-eminent issue. On that basis, besides Ukraine, a potential Baltic aggression against NATO would most persuasively fit the bill.

Why would Putin risk such a move? He is a gambler and might aim to destabilise NATO at a time when he might perceive an opportunity born of allied weakness. He is bogged down in Ukraine, his troops having suffered appalling casualties, and might seek to break the stalemate by attacking the Baltic States, rather as Britain opened a new front at Gallipoli in 1915, with disastrous consequences. Putin is seemingly postponing the drafting of 300,000 men until after next month’s Russian elections, for good reason: the supply of ethnic minorities, mercenaries and convicts is drying up, so that the next draft will drag the sons of middle-class families in Moscow, St Petersburg and other major cities into the Ukraine meat grinder. That is politically dangerous for Putin.

None of that suggests Putin can afford a fresh invasion with Russian boots on the ground in the Baltic theatre. That is not necessarily reassuring: recently he has been deriving greater benefits from his heavy missile attacks on Ukraine than from his troops there. A missile and drone-led aggression against the Baltic States should trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; but are the NATO member states in a condition to respond effectively? Putin may believe that if NATO, with America increasingly seen as a semi-detached and Ukraine-sceptic ally, were to buckle and make concessions, he would have won hegemony over Europe and Ukraine would be finished. The problem is that a miscalculation would make him even more dangerous: Russian military doctrine, inherited from the Soviet Union, has a lower nuclear threshold than Western powers, with battlefield tactical nuclear weapons a potential gateway to full escalation.

The Kremlin sees the Western allies in an unprecedented state of dislocation. America has not been “defeated” in Iran, but it has been neutralised. Its supplies of missiles and other materiel are dangerously low. Domestic public opinion is anti-war and incipiently isolationist. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has damaged the global economy and discredited the West. Donald Trump is hamstrung by the approaching mid-term elections. NATO is internally divided, with the United States and Canada engaged in a trade war; France, hardly ever the best team player, has done comparatively little for Ukraine. The European Union still nurtures dreams of a “European army”, rather than single-mindedly pursuing NATO-based deterrence.

The European response to hybrid aggression by Russia has been belated and weak. Defence spending remains woefully inadequate, notably in Britain where the government is in hock to its narrow-minded backbenchers, concerned much less with the defence of the nation than with delivering ever-increasing welfare benefits to their voter base. We should never have arrived at a situation like this; a strong allied deterrence posture should have removed any need for direct warnings issued in person by the head of the CIA. Responsible defence spending, maintained during the years that were wasted by delusions of a “peace dividend”, would painlessly have guaranteed our security.

Instead, the view from the Kremlin is of a perfect storm engulfing the West’s debt-encumbered governments, presenting the temptation of low-hanging fruit. It is to be hoped John Ratcliffe, a known Russia hawk, delivered a robust message of US resolve to Moscow. For the rest of us, the only sane policy is to devote serious money to defence and to rearm vigorously, against the clock.

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